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Abstract
A large body of research has focused on adversarial attacks which require to
modify all input features with small l2- or l∞-norms. In this paper we instead
focus on query-efficient sparse attacks in the black-box setting. Our versatile
framework, Sparse-RS, based on random search achieves state-of-the-art success
rate and query efficiency for different sparse attack models such as l0-bounded
perturbations (outperforming established white-box methods), adversarial patches,
and adversarial framing. We show the effectiveness of Sparse-RS on different
datasets considering problems from image recognition and malware detection
and multiple variations of sparse threat models, including targeted and universal
perturbations. In particular Sparse-RS can be used for realistic attacks such as
universal adversarial patch attacks without requiring a substitute model. The code
of our framework is available at https://github.com/fra31/sparse-rs.
1 Introduction
The discovery of the vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial examples [9, 49] revealed that
the decision of a classifier or a detector can be changed by small, carefully chosen perturbations of
the input which do not modify its semantic content. Many efforts have been put into developing
increasingly more sophisticated attacks to craft modifications imperceivable to humans but able to fool
classifiers and bypass many defense mechanisms [13, 7]. Such imperceptibility is typically achieved
by constraining or minimizing the lp-norm of the perturbations, usually either l∞ [49, 30, 13, 34, 18],
l2 [37, 13, 45, 18] or l1 [14, 36, 18]. Metrics other than lp-norms and more human perception-aligned
have been also recently used, e.g. Wasserstein distance [53, 23]. However, it has been argued that,
since all these attacks tend to modify all the elements of the input, they are not of practical concern.
A more realistic kind of adversarial perturbations are sparse attacks, where only a small percentage of
components of the input are changed but possibly with large modifications. This can be done without
imposing any relation among the modified features, the so-called l0-attacks [38, 13, 39, 46, 17, 41], or
in a structured manner, e.g. with patches [11, 29, 31]. In this way, the perturbations are indeed visible
but, since restricted to a small portion of the original image, do not hinder the ability of humans
to correctly classify them, and can be applied in the physical world and not only at a digital level
[31, 50, 32]. Moreover, such attacks generalize to tasks outside computer vision, such as malware
detection or natural language processing, where the nature of the domain imposes to modify only a
limited number of input features [21, 28].
A broadly usable attack should also work in the black-box score-based scenario, i.e. the attacker can
only access the output of a classifier f , the score distribution over classes, for any input, but does not
have access to the network weights parametrizing f , and in particularly cannot use its gradient (as
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in the white-box setup). We do not consider more restrictive (e.g. decision-based attacks [10, 12]
where the adversary only knows the label assigned to each input) or more permissive (e.g. a surrogate
model similar to the victim one is available [15, 25]) cases. However, while plenty of black-box
attacks for standard threat models such as l∞ or l2 exist [27, 22, 47, 2, 35, 15, 4], few are aiming at
l0-constrained perturbations [38, 46, 17], and none of them focuses on query efficiency and scales to
datasets like ImageNet without suffering from prohibitive computational cost.
In this paper we propose Sparse-RS, a simple and flexible framework based on random search to
generate sparse adversarial examples with a black-box score-based attack which is effective with
minimal adaptations in a variety of tasks. First, we show for l0-attacks the superior performance
of Sparse-RS in terms of success rate and query efficiency compared to existing black-box and
even white-box attacks for quite different models, datasets and applications (image classification
and malware detection), demonstrating its broad applicability. Then, we show results for the most
challenging task: targeted universal adversarial patches and frames, a perturbation model that can
potentially be realized by a physical attack. Up to our knowledge these are the first black-box attacks
for these threat models. So far all other approaches for universal adversarial patches transferred
the patch obtained by a white-box attack on a known surrogate model, e.g. [11]. Finally, we apply
Sparse-RS in the scenario of image- and location-specific patches and show again its effectiveness
in terms of query efficiency and success rate compared to a recently proposed black-box attack [54].
In the following we first recall the necessary background on adversarial attacks and random search,
then we introduce our new framework, including a theoretical analysis for the l0-threat model,
and finally present the results of Sparse-RS on several tasks, together with the description of the
experimental setups and suitable competitors. Omitted proofs, experimental details, additional results
and visualizations and ablation studies are available in the Appendix.
2 Black-box adversarial attacks
Let f : S ⊆ Rd → RK be a classifier which assigns an input x ∈ S to class c =
arg maxr=1,...,K fr(x). The goal of an untargeted attack is to craft a perturbation δ ∈ Rd such that
arg max
r=1,...,K
fr(x+ δ) 6= c, x+ δ ∈ S and δ ∈ T , (1)
where S is the input domain of the specific task and T the constraints the adversarial perturbation has
to fulfill (e.g. lp-norm smaller than a threshold), while a targeted attack aims at δ such that
arg max
r=1,...,K
fr(x+ δ) = t, x+ δ ∈ S and δ ∈ T , (2)
with t as target class. Generating such δ can be translated into an optimization problem as
min
δ∈Rd
L(f, x, δ, c) s.t. x+ δ ∈ S and δ ∈ T (3)
by choosing a proper loss function L which minimized leads to the desired classification. We refer
to the scenario in which an attack is carried out as a threat model: targeted vs untargeted, black- vs
white-box, constraints set T to satisfy, level of knowledge of the attacker.
Since a black-box attacker cannot rely on gradient-based methods to solve (3), many approaches
have appeared: first, [26, 52] proposed to approximate the gradient through finite difference methods,
later improved to reduce their high computational cost in terms of queries of the victim models
[8, 51, 27]. Alternatively, [3, 33] use genetic algorithms in the context of image classification and
malware detection respectively. A line of research has focused on rephrasing l∞-constrained attacks
as discrete optimization problems [47, 2, 35], where specific techniques lead to significantly better
query-efficiency. [19] sample candidate adversarial attacks via the Metropolis MCMC method, while
[22] adopt a modification of canonical random search to produce perturbations with minimal l2-norm.
The method closest in spirit to our proposed one is the Square Attack of [4], which is state-of-the-art
for l∞- and l2-bounded black-box attacks. It uses random search in order to iteratively generate
samples on the surface of the lp-ball of the chosen threat model. This, together with a carefully crafted
sampling distribution and specific initialization, leads to a simple algorithm which outperforms more
sophisticated and complex attacks in terms of success rate and query efficiency. In this paper we show
that the idea of random search can be transferred to the case of sparse attacks, where the non-convex,
combinatorial constraints are not easily handled even by gradient-based white-box attacks.
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Algorithm 1: Sparse-RS
input : loss L, xorig, max query N , sparsity k, input space S
output :minimizer of L
1 M ← k indices of elements to be perturbed ; // initialize M
2 ∆← values of the perturbation to be applied ; // initialize ∆
3 z ← xorig, zM ← ∆ ; // set elements in M to values in ∆
4 L∗ ← L(z), i← 0 ; // initial value of the loss
5 while i < N and success not achieved do
6 M ′ ← randomly sampled modification of M ; // new set of indices
7 ∆′ ← randomly sampled modification of ∆ ; // new perturbation
8 z ← xorig, zM ′ ← ∆′ ; // create new candidate in S
9 if L(z) < L∗ then
10 L∗ ← L(z), M ←M ′, ∆← ∆′ ; // if loss improves, update sets
11 i← i+ 1
12 z ← xorig, zM ← ∆ ; // return best solution found
13 return z
3 Sparse-RS: a random search based framework for adversarial attacks
Random search (RS) is a well known scheme for derivative free optimization [43]. Given an objective
function L to minimize, a starting point x(0) and a sampling distribution D, RS iterations are given by
δ ∼ D(x(i)), x(i+1) = arg miny∈{x(i),x(i)+δ} L(y). (4)
This means that at every step an update of the current iterate x(i) is sampled according to D and
accepted only if it attains a lower value of the objective function than x(i), otherwise the procedure is
repeated. Although not explicitly mentioned in Eq. (4), constraints on the space of the acceptable
points can be integrated ensuring that δ is sampled so that x(i) + δ is a feasible solution. Thus even
complex constraints e.g. combinatorial ones can easily be integrated as RS just needs to be able to
produce feasible points in contrast to gradient-based methods which depend on a continuous set to
optimize over (or at least an embedding of the discrete set into a continuous one). While simple and
flexible, RS is an effective tool in many tasks [55, 4], with the key ingredient for its success being a
proper sampling distribution D to guide the exploration of the space of possible solutions.
We summarize our general framework based on random search to generate sparse adversarial attacks,
Sparse-RS, in Alg. 1, where the sparsity k indicates the maximum number of features that can be
perturbed. Note that our algorithm does not try to minimize the amount of modified dimensions but
rather exploits the whole budget k. In Alg. 1, since sparse attacks can be characterized by a pair
(M,∆), where M is the set of components to be perturbed and ∆ are the values to be inserted at M
to form the adversarial input, also the sampling distribution D consists of a two-stage process. First,
we sample a random update of the locations M of the current perturbation (step 6) and, second, a
random update of its values ∆ (step 7). In some threat models (e.g. adversarial frames) the set M
cannot be changed, so M ′ ≡M at every step. How ∆′ is generated depends on the specific case, so
we present the individual procedures in the next sections.
Common to all variations of Sparse-RS is that the whole budget for the perturbations is fully
exploited both in terms of number of modified components and magnitude of the elementwise
changes (constrained only by the limits of the input domain S). This follows the intuition that larger
perturbations should lead faster to an adversarial example. Moreover, the difference of the candidates
M ′ and ∆′ with M and ∆ shrinks gradually with the iterations. The rationale behind this is to mimic
the reduction of the step size in gradient-based optimization: initial large steps allow to quickly
decrease the objective loss, but smaller steps are necessary to refine a close-to-optimal solution at
the end of the algorithm. Finally, we impose a limit N on the maximum number of queries of the
classifier, i.e. evaluations of the objective function.
As objective function L to be minimized, we use in the case of untargeted attacks the margin loss
Lmargin(f(·), y) = fy(·)−maxr 6=y fr(·), where y is the correct class, so that L < 0 is equivalent to
misclassification, whereas for targeted attacks we use the cross-entropy loss LCE of the target class t,
namely LCE(f(·), t) = −ft(·) + log
(∑K
r=1 e
fr(·)
)
.
3
The code of the Sparse-RS franework is available at https://github.com/fra31/sparse-rs.
4 l0-bounded attacks
The first scenario we consider is that of l0-bounded adversarial examples, which means that only k
pixels of a clean input xorig ∈ [0, 1]h×w×c (width w, height h, color c) can be modified, but there are
no constraints on the magnitude of the perturbations except for those of the input domain.
l0-RS algorithm: Let U be the set of the h · w pixels. In this case the set M ⊂ U is initialized
sampling uniformly k elements of U , while ∆ ∼ U({0, 1}k×c), that is random values in {0, 1}
(every perturbed pixel gets one of the corners of the color cube [0, 1]c). Then, at the i-th iteration, we
randomly select A ⊂M and B ⊂ U \M , with |A| = |B| = α(i) · k, and create M ′ = (M \A)∪B.
∆′ is formed by sampling random values from {0, 1}c for the elements in B, i.e. those which were
not perturbed at the previous iteration. The quantity α(i) controls how much M ′ differs from M and
decays following a predetermined piecewise constant schedule rescaled according to the maximum
number of queries N . The schedule is completely determined by the single value αinit, used to
calculate α(i) for every iteration i, which is also the only free hyperparameter of our scheme (details
about the algorithm, schedule and values of αinit in App. A and B).
4.1 Theoretical analysis of l0-RS
We here analyze l0-RS on a binary classifier. While the analysis does not directly transfer to neural
networks, most modern neural network architectures result in piecewise linear classifiers [5, 16], so
that the result should approximately hold for a sufficiently small neighborhood of the target point x.
As in the malware detection task from Sec. 4.4, we assume that the input x has binary features,
x ∈ {0, 1}d, and we denote the label by y ∈ {−1, 1} and the gradient of the linear model bywx ∈ Rd.
Then the problem (3) of finding the optimal l0 adversarial example is equivalent to:
arg min
‖δ‖0≤k
xi+δi∈{0,1}
y 〈wx, x+ δ〉 = arg min
‖δ‖0≤k
δi∈{0,1−2xi}
〈ywx, δ〉 = arg min
‖δ‖0≤k
δi∈{0,1}
〈ywx  (1− 2x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wˆx
, δ〉. (5)
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Figure 1: Comparison of the query effi-
ciency of l0-RS to the performance of the
naive weight estimation baseline.
In the white-box case, i.e. when wx is known, the solution
is to simply set δi = 1 for the k smallest weights of wˆx.
The black-box case, where wx is unknown and we are
only allowed to query the model predictions 〈wˆx, z〉 for
any z ∈ Rd, is more complicated since the naive weight
estimation algorithm requires O(d) queries to first esti-
mate wˆx and then to perform the attack by selecting the k
minimal weights. This naive approach is prohibitively ex-
pensive for high-dimensional datasets (e.g., d = 150,528
on ImageNet assuming 224× 224× 3 images). However,
the problem of generating adversarial examples does not
have to be always solved exactly, and often it is enough
to find an approximate solution. Therefore we can be sat-
isfied with only identifying k among the m smallest weights. Indeed, the focus is not on exactly
identifying the solution but rather on having an algorithm that in expectation requires a sublinear
number of queries. With this goal, we show that l0-RS satisfies this requirement for large enough m.
Proposition 4.1. The expected number tk of queries needed for l0-RS with α(i) = 1/k to find a set of
k weights out of the smallest m weights of a linear model is:
E [tk] = (d− k)k
k−1∑
i=0
1
(k − i)(m− i) < (d− k)k
ln(k) + 2
m− k . (6)
The proof is deferred to App. E and resembles that of the coupon collector problem [20]. In practice
on non-linear models, l0-RS uses α(i) > 1/k for better exploration initially, but then progressively
reduces it. The main conclusion from Proposition 4.1 is that E [tk] indeed becomes sublinear for large
enough gap m− k, as illustrated in Fig. 1, where we plot the performance of l0-RS for d = 150,528
and k = 150 which is equivalent to our ImageNet experiments below with 50 pixels perturbed.
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Figure 2: Progression success rate vs number of queries for black-box untargeted l0-attacks (solid
lines) on ImageNet. The dashed lines indicate the success rate of white-box attacks. At all sparsity
levels l0-RS (red) outperforms PGD0 with gradient estimation (blue), achieving higher success rate
than SparseFool [36] (green) and better or similar results compared to white-box PGD0 [17] (black).
4.2 ImageNet experiments
Experimental setup: ImageNet dataset contains RGB images resized to shape 224 × 224, that is
50176 pixels. We test the robustness of VGG-16-BN and ResNet-50 from the PyTorch pretrained
models on 500 images of the validation set. We modify k ∈ {50, 100, 150} pixels to assess the
effectiveness of the untargeted attacks at different thresholds (for black-box attacks, with a limit of
10,000 queries), while for targeted attacks we use k ∈ {150, 300} (query limit 100,000).
Competitors: The existing black-box l0-attacks [38, 46, 17] do not aim at query efficiency but
rather try to minimize the size of the perturbations. Among them, only CornerSearch [17] scales to
ImageNet-size, but it requires 8×#pixels queries only for the initial phase, exceeding the query
limit we fix. Among white-box attacks, we compare to SparseFool [36] and PGD0 [17], since [36, 17]
showed them to be more effective than [39, 13] and we observe in our tests that they outperform also
[41]. Finally, we introduce a black-box version of PGD0 where the gradient is estimated by finite
difference approximation as done in e.g. [26] (details about the attacks in App. A).
Table 1: Success rate of targeted l0-attacks on
VGG and ResNet modifying k ∈ {150, 300} pix-
els. Note that PGD0 is a white-box attack.
attack k = 150 k = 300VGG ResNet VGG ResNet
PGD0 [17] 55.6% 51.0% 95.4% 95.4%
l0-RS 98.2% 95.6% 99.6% 99.6%
Results: For untargeted attacks, we show in
Fig. 2 the progression of the success rate (on
the initially correctly classified points) vs the
number of queries used by the black-box attacks
and (dashed lines) the final success rate of the
white-box ones. In all cases l0-RS outperforms
the competitors, including the white-box attacks,
and needs only a limited amount of queries to
get high fooling rate, e.g. on VGG with k = 150
it achieves 100% of success rate using on average 171 queries, with a median of 25 (the complete
statistics about query efficiency is in App. A). Table 1 shows the results of targeted attacks: l0-RS
achieves higher success rate than the white-box PGD0 of [17], especially for smaller k (we do not
compare to the other methods as PGD0 is the strongest competitor in the easier untargeted scenario).
4.3 MNIST robust models
We evaluate l0-RS on robust models on MNIST, which contains greyscale images x ∈ [0, 1]28×28×1.
[46] propose two models, ABS and Binary ABS, reported to have robust accuracy on 100 points of
69% and 77% respectively against l0-attacks with sparsity k = 12 (robust accuracy is defined as the
classification error on the adversarial examples crafted by an attacker). These results are obtained by
the Pointwise Attack with 10 restarts [46]. We run l0-RS on both ABS models in the same setup as in
[46], using 10,000 queries and 5 random restarts, and achieve a robust accuracy of 45% for ABS and
49% on Binary ABS, which is a significant improvement over the Pointwise Attack in [46].
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Figure 3: We plot success rate vs number of queries for JSMA with gradient estimation (blue)
and our l0-RS (red), when used to fool a malware detector on Drebin [6]. For every sparsity level
k ∈ {20, 30, 40} l0-RS outperforms the competitor, with a large gap in the low query regime.
4.4 Malware detection
While in image classification the input space is continuous, other tasks are characterized by discrete
features, e.g. in malware detection. We consider the Drebin dataset [6] consisting of 129,013 benign
and malicious Android applications, with d = 545, 333 features. A data point is encoded as a binary
vector x ∈ {0, 1}d indicating whether each feature is present or not in x. Thus, we apply l0-RS as
described at the beginning of the section for images as input by setting h = d and w = c = 1 such
that x ∈ {0, 1}d×1×1 (details in App. B). Then, we can modify malware applications with a limited
number of insertions, without access to the internal weights of the classifier, to get them not detected.
Experimental setup: Following [21], we restrict the attacks to only adding features which preserve
the functionality of the application (no features are removed). We trained a fully connected model
which achieves a test accuracy of 98.85% and test its robustness on 500 malicious inputs from the
test set, modifying k ∈ {20, 30, 40} features, within a maximum of 10,000 queries.
Competitors: [21] successfully fooled similar models with a variant of the white-box JSMA [39],
and [40] confirms that it is the most effective technique on Drebin, compared to the attacks of
[48, 1, 24] including adaptation of FGSM [49] and PGD [30, 34]. We use JSMA in a black-box
version with gradient estimation (details in App. B). [33] propose a black-box genetic algorithm
with prior knowledge of the importance of the features for misclassification (via a pretrained random
forest) which is not comparable to our threat model.
Results: Fig. 3 shows the progression of success rate (computed on the initially correctly classified
points) of the attacks over number of queries used. At all three sparsity levels, our l0-RS attack
(in red) outperforms JSMA with gradient estimation (in blue), especially in the low query regime,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our framework beyond image classification.
5 Adversarial patches and frames
Adversarial patches [11] and frames [56] are sparse perturbations with a predefined structure. The
most challenging and interesting type are universal targeted attacks where the classifier predicts a
desired class regardless of the image (and location of the perturbation). Thus the goal is to produce a
single perturbation which effectively deceives the classifier even when applied to new images not seen
during its generation (see examples in Fig. 4). In Sec. 5.1 we show that Sparse-RS is able to craft
such attacks only querying the target classifier and using a minimal amount of training images, while
we defer the discussion of the untargeted case to App. C . We are not aware of any black-box method
for this difficult task which is not based on transfer attacks. For the simpler task of image-specific
adversarial patches (Sec. 5.2) we compare Patch-RS to a recent black-box attack [54].
5.1 Universal targeted attacks: patches and frames
Patches: The first type of universal perturbation we consider are squared patches, which should
ideally fool a classifier independently from where they are applied. To achieve this, given a batch of
n = 100 training images to create the patch, we copy it 2 times, so to have 300 images. Then we
randomly select for each of them a location where the perturbation will be applied. These locations
are then kept fixed throughout the iterations of the random search, i.e. the set M in the general Alg. 1
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Table 2: We report the success rate of universal targeted attacks for 6 target classes when applied to
unseen images. We compare the performance of our Sparse-RS, with a budget of either 20,000 or
100,000 queries for creating the perturbation, to that of the transfer-based PGD-attack.
maypole mailbox peacock traffic light digital clock wardrobe mean
patches
Tr-PGD 1.1% 3.3% 1.7% 29.7% 0.6% 0.3% 6.1%
RS20k 0.6% 25.8% 5.0% 78.6% 79.0% 0.3% 31.6%
RS100k 25.5% 69.1% 51.5% 95.0% 93.9% 2.4% 56.2%
frames
Tr-PGD 30.4% 0.1% 9.3% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 7.5%
RS20k 85.9% 6.3% 74.0% 82.5% 8.0% 0.0% 42.8%
RS100k 93.9% 26.6% 88.2% 92.4% 26.5% 0.1% 54.6%
target: peacock target: traffic light target: digital clock
orig: wood_rabbit
 pred: peacock
orig: wallaby
 pred: peacock
orig: oscilloscope
 pred: traffic_light
orig: chiton
 pred: traffic_light
orig: scabbard
 pred: digital_clock
orig: space_heater
 pred: digital_clock
orig: tobacco_shop
 pred: peacock
orig: oxygen_mask
 pred: bubble
orig: prayer_rug
 pred: slot
orig: box_turtle
 pred: traffic_light
orig: echidna
 pred: digital_clock
orig: eggnog
 pred: digital_clock
Figure 4: Examples of universal targeted patches (top) and frames (bottom) generated by Sparse-RS
applied to random images (patches applied at random location) for 3 target classes (indicated on top):
above each image we report the true class and the prediction after the application of the perturbation.
does not get updated (step 6 does not modify M ). The patch is initialized and updated with the l∞
Square Attack [4] where the only constraints are given by the box [0, 1]d, so that all entries of the
patch are in {0, 1}. Denoting {xi, yi}3ni=1 the images and correct labels in the expanded batch, t a
target class and f the classifier, our algorithm minimizes the loss
Ltarg({xi, yi}3ni=1) =
3n∑
i=1
LCE(f(xi), t), (7)
and a candidate update is only accepted if it reduces the loss without increasing the number of points
where the attack is not successful.
Frames: The second type of universal perturbations consists in adversarial frames, introduced in
[56], which modify only the pixels on the borders of the image: if the frame has width w, then all the
pixels in the first/last w rows/columns can be perturbed (thus the set M of the modified pixels is fixed
across iterations). For our attack Frames-RS we initialize the frame with random values in {0, 1}
and the proposed updates are built sampling α(i) ·k (k is the total of pixels perturbed) random squares
of size w × w (partially or totally) overlapping with the frame and changing all the corresponding
pixels (intersecting the frame) to the same randomly chosen corner of the color cube [0, 1]3. As usual
α(i) decreases with iterations and we use the same loss and acceptance criterion as for patches (see
Eq. (7), where now the batch is not copied, so i = 1, . . . , n).
Competitors: As we are not aware of other black-box methods for this scenario not based on transfer
attacks, we compare our universal perturbations via Sparse-RS to those obtained with white-box
PGD on a surrogate model and then transferred to the victim model. At each iteration of PGD we
sample a random location for each image in the training batch, apply the current patch and compute
the gradient of the cross-entropy loss wrt each input. Then we sum the gradients at the patch locations,
update the patch with a step in the direction of the sign of the overall gradient and clip it to [0, 1]d.
For frames we use the same procedure without sampling the location. We use the sign of the gradient
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as the only constraints on the perturbations are the componentwise limits of the input domain [0, 1]d.
We note that [29] and [56] used similar techniques, but tested the resulting perturbations on the same
model used at training time, while [11] used 4 surrogate models to craft an adversarial patch and then
transferred it to the victim model. We provide only one surrogate classifier.
Results: We test the attacks on VGG on ImageNet using for both the same 100 training images. For
the transfer-based PGD attack we craft the universal perturbations on ResNet, while Sparse-RS
attacks directly VGG (as it is black-box). To evaluate universality of the patches (size 50× 50), we
compute the success rate of the patch applied to 500 unseen images at 1000 random locations each.
Similarly, we compute the success rate of adversarial frames (w = 4) on 5000 images. We report the
results in Table 2 for 6 target classes, 3 hand picked among classes commonly predicted by untargeted
attacks and 3 randomly chosen. Sparse-RS outperforms PGD significantly, even when only 20,000
queries are used for training instead of the standard 100,000 (this is the number of queries usually
given to non-universal targeted attacks in the l∞- and l2-threat models, see e.g. [47, 35, 4]). Note
that PGD achieves success rate close to 100% for almost all the classes (the target class "wardrobe"
is an exception) when evaluated on unseen images on ResNet, which shows that its perturbations
are model-specific and do not transfer to VGG. The low success rate of the transfer attack is in line
with [11] who reported for the class “toaster” a success rate of ≈ 6% for 5% changed pixels. Thus it
is important to have a black-box attack like Sparse-RS which does not rely on a surrogate model.
The success rate of Sparse-RS significantly varies with the target class, from 0.1% of "wardrobe" to
95.0% of "traffic light", and some of the classes are better suited for patches or frames.
5.2 Image-specific untargeted adversarial patches
Attacks: A black-box (not transfer-based) method to produce image- and location-specific patches
(both perturbation and position are optimized for each input independently) has been recently
introduced in [54]. While [54] allows multiple patches on an image, we use their attack, TPA, in the
standard setting of a single patch. [42] has proposed a PGD-based white-box attack for this scenario
which we combine with the gradient estimation technique of [27]. For Patch-RS we alternate
iterations where updates of the patch are sampled (step 7 in Alg. 1) and where a new position is tested
(step 6 in Alg. 1). Please see App. D for details about our algorithm and other attacks.
Results: In Table 3 we report success rate, mean and median number of queries used (considering
either only successful samples or all) by untargeted attacks with patches of size 30 × 30 on 500
images of ImageNet with query limit of 10,000 (VGG and ResNet as target models). Patch-RS
achieves the best results. We note that the metrics only on the successful points are highly biased by
the success rate (other attacks likely fail on the difficult points where Patch-RS succeeds after many
queries). Finally, Fig. 5 shows some resulting adversarial examples of Patch-RS: random search is
able to optimize the position of the patch so to cover semantic features of the original subject.
Table 3: Success rate and query statistics of image-specific 30× 30 patches for VGG and ResNet.
The query statistics are computed once only on the successful points and once on all points (the query
limit is 10,000). Patch-RS outperforms TPA both in success rate and query efficiency.
successful points all points
attack success rate average queries median queries average queries median queriesVGG ResNet VGG ResNet VGG ResNet VGG ResNet VGG ResNet
PGD w/ GE 46.7% 37.3% 522 595 30 30 5574 6494 10000 10000
TPA [54] 60.2% 59.9% 1760 1830 1200 1200 4536 4757 1600 2000
Patch-RS 95.8% 90.2% 886 996 184 162 1270 1875 201 230
original: lion
 predicted: baboon
original: fire_engine
 predicted: traffic_light
original: knee_pad
 predicted: pill_bottle
original: water_ouzel
 predicted: oystercatcher
original: potpie
 predicted: hotdog
original: scorpion
 predicted: pill_bottle
Figure 5: Image and location-specific untargeted patches of size 30× 30 generated by our Patch-RS.
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Broader Impact
In this paper we discuss different variants of sparse black-box adversarial attacks where universal
adversarial patches/frames have the potential to be used as a physical attack.
On the positive side powerful adversarial attacks are necessary to test security and safety of machine
learning systems e.g. vulnerability to l0-attacks is a sign that an image recognition system might
have unexpected behavior in case of pixel failures. Moreover, in particular (universal) adversarial
patches/frames challenge our understanding what current neural networks really learn when they
classify an image. In particular adversarial frames do not change at all the central part of the image
content so it is quite disturbing that current architectures fail at all. Thus these kind of attacks should
trigger the development of new architectures which are inherently robust to such changes.
On the negative side in particular black-box attacks have the potential to be used by a real attacker on
some machine learning system which could cause potential harm to people. However, we think that it
is impossible to construct secure and safe systems without discussing possibilities to challenge their
robustness.
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A l0-bounded attacks: image classification
Details of l0-RS algorithm: As mentioned in Sec. 4, at iteration i the new setM ′ is formed modifying
α(i)·k (rounded to the closest positive integer) elements ofM containing the currently modified dimen-
sions (see step 6 in Alg. 1). Inspired by the step-size reduction in gradient-based optimization methods,
we progressively reduce α(i). Assuming N = 10, 000, the schedule of α(i) is piecewise constant
where the constant segments start at iterations j ∈ {0, 50, 200, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000, 6000, 8000}
with values αinit/βj , βj ∈ {2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20}. For a different maximum number of queries
N , the schedule is linearly rescaled accordingly. In practice, we use αinit = 0.3 and αinit = 0.1 for
the untargeted and targeted scenario respectively.
Additional results: We here report more detailed statistics about the comparison of different attacks
on the task of l0-bounded perturbations (see Sec. 4.2). In particular, Table 4 shows the success
rate (on the initally correcly classified points out of 500 of the validation set of ImageNet) of both
white- and black-box attacks, for the three sparsity level considered, with l0-RS outperforming the
competitors. In Table 5 we report the statistics about the query efficiency of black-box untargeted
and targeted attacks. We compute first the average and median number of queries necessary to
generate a successful adversarial example (this means that for each attack only the successful points
are considered in such statistics) and second the same metrics including all points (i.e. when an
adversarial example is not found we use the query limit to calculate the statistics). We recall that we
set query limits of 10,000 and 100,000 for untargeted and targeted scenario respectively, consistently
with previous works e.g. [47, 35, 4]. Our attack is able to achieve high fooling rate in all threat
models requiring a small computational effort, especially in the easier untargeted scenario.
Table 4: Success rate of l0-attacks on VGG-16-BN and ResNet-50 perturbing at most k ∈
{50, 100, 150} pixels. For black-box attacks we set a maximum of 10, 000 queries. Our Sparse-RS
outperforms both white- and black-box attacks at every threshold.
attack scenario k = 50 k = 100 k = 150VGG ResNet VGG ResNet VGG ResNet
SparseFool [36] white-box 27.2% 26.5% 41.7% 46.2% 52.0% 56.6%
PGD0 [17] white-box 77.8% 72.8% 96.0% 95.1% 99.5% 99.2%
PGD0 w/ GE black-box 49.1% 38.0% 58.6% 50.9% 68.1% 59.4%
l0-RS black-box 97.6% 94.6% 99.7% 100% 100% 100%
Table 5: Success rate and query metrics of targeted l0-attacks on VGG-16-BN (V) and ResNet-50 (R)
at sparsity levels k. Mean and median queries are calculated once only on successful samples, once
on all points using the query limit for the unsuccessful ones.
successful points all points
k attack succ. rate % avg. queries med. queries avg. queries med. queriesV R V R V R V R V R
untarg.
50 PGD0 w/GE 49.1% 38.0% 958 691 29 24 5563 6458 10000 10000
l0-RS 97.6% 94.6% 511 672 82 133 737 1176 88 150
100 PGD0 w/GE 58.6% 50.9% 276 511 12 14 4304 5170 256 7794
l0-RS 99.7% 100% 282 578 42 81 308 578 44 81
150 PGD0 w/GE 68.1% 59.4% 373 338 6 8 3447 4263 42 240
l0-RS 100% 100% 171 359 25 49 171 359 25 49
targ. 150 l0-RS 98.2% 95.6% 8243 10534 4542 6529 9895 14470 4914 6960
300 l0-RS 99.6% 99.6% 7472 10768 3574 5771 7842 11125 3676 5869
Details about the attacks: We use SparseFool [36] as implemented in Foolbox [44] and optimize
the hyperparameter which controls the sparsity of the solutions (called λ, setting finally λ = 1) to
achieve the best results. The implementation in Foolbox has other two hyperparameters: we use 60
steps and 10 subsamples (default values are 30 and 10), after checking that higher values do not lead
to an improved performance but significantly increase the computational cost. For PGD0 we use
500 iterations (5,000 for targeted attacks) and step size 0.05 · d (with d = 224× 224× 3 the input
dimension). PGD0 with GE uses the same gradient step of PGD0 but with step size 5 · d. To estimate
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the gradient we use finite difference, similarly to [26], as shown in steps 4-7 of Alg. 2, with x(i),
the current iterate, instead of xorig (we use σ =
√
d and η = 0.01, after optimizing them, which is
in line with what suggested in [27] for this algorithm). We also tested that sampling more points
to better approximate the gradient at each iteration leads to similar success rate with worse query
consumption.
B l0-bounded attacks: malware detection
Dataset: The Drebin dataset [6] consists of 129, 013 Android applications, among which 123, 453
are benign and 5, 560 malicious, with d = 545, 333 features divided into 8 families. Data points are
represented by a binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}d indicating whether each feature is present or not in x.
Experimental setup: As [21], we restrict the attacks to only adding features from the first 4 families,
that is modifications to the manifest of the applications, to preserve the functionality of the samples
(no feature present in the clean data is removed), which leaves a maximum of 233,727 alterable
dimensions. Only adding features means that all values in ∆ equal 1, thus ∆′ ≡ ∆ at every iteration
(step 7 in Alg. 1) and only the set M is updated. For our attack we use αinit = 1.6 and the same
schedule of α(i) of l0-RS on image classification tasks (see Sec. A).
Model: We trained the classifier, which has 1 fully-connected hidden layer with 200 units and uses
ReLU as activation function, with 20 epochs of SGD minimizing the cross-entropy loss, with learning
rate of 0.1 reduced by a factor of 10 after 10 and 15 epochs. We use batches of size 2000, consisting
of 50% of benign and 50% of malicious examples. For training we merged the training and validation
sets of one of the splits provided by [6]. It achieves test accuracy of 98.85%, with false positive rate
of 1.01%, false negative rate 4.29%.
Algorithm 2: JSMA w/ GE
input :L, xorig, N , k, m, σ, η
output :z
1 g ← 0, q ← 2 ·m
2 while q ≤ N do
3 for i = 1, . . . ,m do
4 s← N (0, I)/σ
5 l1 ← L(xorig + η · s)
6 l2 ← L(xorig − η · s)
7 g ← g + (l1 − l2)/(2η) · s
8 z ← xorig
9 A← indices of k largest positive
components of g (if there are)
10 zA ← 1
11 q ← q + 2 ·m
12 if z is adversarial then return;
JSMA with gradient estimation: The idea of the
white-box attack of [21] is, given a sparsity level of
k, to perturb iteratively the feature of the iterate x(i)
which corresponds to the largest value (if positive)
of∇xLCE(f(x(i)), y), with f the classifier, y the cor-
rect label and LCE the cross-entropy loss, until either
the maximum number of modifications are made or
misclassification is achieved. With only approximate
gradients this approach is not particularly effective.
However, since k  d and only additions can be
made, we aim at estimating the gradient of the cross-
entropy loss at xorig and then set to 1 the k elements
(originally 0) of xorig with largest component in the
approximated gradient. Chasing query-efficiency, ev-
ery m iterations of gradient estimation through finite
difference we check if an adversarial example has
been found (we do not count these queries in the
total for the query limit). Alg. 2 shows the proce-
dure, and for the main experiments in Sec. 4.4 we set
m = 5 and σ = η = 1 (we tested other values which
achieved worse or similar performance).
C Universal attacks: patches and frames
Details of Patch-RS and Frame-RS algorithms: In these threat models, the value of α(i) starts
with α(0) = αinit and then is halved at iteration j ∈ {10, 50, 200, 500, 1000, 4000, 8000} if the query
limit is N = 10, 000, otherwise the values of j are linearly rescaled according to the new N . We
initialize the patch with 1 pixel wide vertical stripes, each of a random color in {0, 1}c, as in [4].
Then, to update the content of the patch we use the same sampling distribution of the l∞ Square
Attack [4]: given a patch of size s× s, a square with side of size
√
α(i) · s (subset of the patch) is
sampled and all its pixels set to the same color of the 2c in {0, 1}c (we use αinit = 0.3). For frames of
width w, gathering in total k pixels, α(i) · k indicates the number of squares of size w×w sampled at
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iteration i and used to update the adversarial frame (αinit = 0.005). For crafting the perturbations we
use a batch of 100 images from the validation set, so that in the case of patches the expanded batch of
300 data points (see Sec. 5.1) fits into GPU memory (16 GB) and forward passes for all the images
can be executed with a single run.
Table 6: Success rate of untar-
geted universal patches and frames
given by transfer-based PGD and
Sparse-RS on unseen images from
ImageNet on VGG.
patches frames
50× 50 w = 4
Tr-PGD 20.0% 46.8%
RS 95.4% 98.3%
Untargeted attacks: In case of untargeted attacks the loss
minimized to create the perturbations is
Luntarg({xi, yi}mi=1) = −
m∑
i=1
LCE(f(xi), yi), (8)
with the same notation of Sec. 5.1 and m the total number
of images used at training time (we use the same 100 images
for all the attacks but for patches the batch is copied 2 times,
so in the end m = 300). In fact, we found maximizing the
cross-entropy loss of the correct class more effective than using
the margin loss as for the untargeted attacks in the l0-bounded
threat model. Moreover, we keep the acceptance rule used for the universal targeted setting. We
report the comparison of the success rate achieved by white-box PGD through transfer attack and
Sparse-RS in Table 6, computed as for Table 2 on VGG, showing that both Patch-RS and Frame-RS
outperform PGD. Finally, we observe that our untargeted attacks, when cause a misclassication,
lead the model to predict in the large majority of the cases the classes which are easiest for targeted
perturbations, i.e. "traffic light" for patches and "maypole" for frames.
Additional visualizations: We show in Fig. 6 the universal patches for targeted and untargeted
attacks by white-box PGD (top) and Patch-RS (bottom). Moreover, Figures 9 and 10 show examples
of how universal targeted patches and frames generated with Sparse-RS are used and affect the
classification of random images for the target classes used in Sec. 5.1.
PGD
Patch-RS
maypole mailbox peacock traffic_light digital_clock wardrobe untargeted
maypole mailbox peacock traffic_light digital_clock wardrobe untargeted
Figure 6: Universal patches of size 50× 50 crafted by PGD (top row) and RS (bottom row): above
each patch we indicate the target class (or untargeted attacks).
Additional results and details: We evaluate the performance of patches and frames generated
by PGD when used to modify unseen images to attack ResNet, that is the model on which the
perturbations were generated. As shown in Table 7, when the adversarial attacks are transferred to
unseen images but evaluated on the same classifier used at training time, PGD has very high success
rate, with the exception of the class "wardrobe", which results being particularly hard to use as target
(the statistics are computed as in Table 2 in Sec. 5.1). Finally, for generating the adversarial patches
and frames we use 1000 iterations of PGD and step size of 0.05 in the direction of the sign of the
gradient (as explained in Sec. 5.1).
Table 7: We report the success rate of the universal targeted and untargeted attacks given by PGD on
ResNet, that is the same model used to generate patches and frames.
maypole mailbox peacock traffic light digital clock wardrobe untargeted
patches 90.2% 93.3% 94.4% 97.5% 99.8% 6.3% 99.9%
frames 99.9% 92.9% 99.8% 99.8% 99.9% 71.9% 99.9%
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D Image- and location-specific adversarial patches
Patch-RS algorithm: As mentioned in Sec. 5.2, in this scenario we optimize via random search the
attacks for each image independently. In Patch-RS we alternate iterations where a candidate update
of the patch is sampled with others where a new location is sampled. We have a location update every
m iterations, with m = 5 · (1 + bi/1000c) and i the current iteration. The values of pixels of the patch
are updated according to the same sampling distribution used for universal patches. The position of
the patch is updated with an uniformly sampled shift in [−h(i), h(i)] for each direction (plus clipping
to the image size if necessary), where h(i) is linearly decreased from h(0) = 0.75 · simage to h(N) = 0
(simage indicates the side of the squared images). In this way, initially the patch can be easily moved on
the image, while towards the final iterations it is kept (almost) fixed and only its values are optimized.
Competitors: The first competitor we consider is a black-box version of the white-box PGD-based
attack of [42]. It updates the patch with a step in the direction of the sign of the gradient in order
to maximize the cross-entropy function at the current iterate. Then it tests if shifting of sshift pixels
the patch in one of the four possible directions improves the loss. If so, the location is updated
otherwise kept ([42] have a version where only one random shift is tested, but this leads to lower
success rate in our experiments). We use the technique introduced by [27] in the context of l∞- and
l2-bounded attacks to approximate the gradient via finite differences. This implies that every iteration
costs 6 queries (2 for gradient estimation, 4 for the location update). We optimized the large number
of hyperparameters to achieve the best success rate: for PGD of [42] we use step size of 0.3 and
sshift = 10, for the method of [27] we set "tile size" to 56, "exploration" to 100, "online learning
rate" to 100, η for finite difference to 10. The second method we compare to is TPA [54], which is
based on reinforcement learning and exploits a dictionary of patches. Note that in [54] TPA was
used primarily putting multiple patches on the same image to achieve misclassification, while our
threat model does not include this option. We obtained the optimal values for the hyperparameters
("rl batch" 400 and number of steps 25) via personal communication with the authors. TPA has a
mechanism of early stopping, which means that it might happen that not the whole budget of queries
is exploited even for unsuccessful points. Finally, [54] show that TPA significantly outperforms the
methods of [19], which also generates image-specific patches, although optimizing the shape and
the location but not the values of the perturbation. Thus we do not compare directly to [19] in our
experiments.
E Theoretical analysis
Proposition 4.1. The expected number tk of queries needed for l0-RS with α(i) = 1/k to find a set of
k weights out of the smallest m weights of a linear model is:
E [tk] = (d− k)k
k−1∑
i=0
1
(k − i)(m− i) < (d− k)k
ln(k) + 2
m− k . (9)
Proof. According to the l0-RS algorithm, we have d features grouped in a set U and the goal is to
find a set M ⊂ U containing k elements among the m smallest elements of U . Since α(i) = 1/k, at
every iteration we pick one element p ∈M to remove from M and one element q ∈ U \M to add
to M . This results in a binary vector znew ∈ {0, 1}d indicating which are the features in M . Then
we query the black-box linear model to determine whether the loss at a new point znew improves
compared to the point on the previous iteration zcurrent, i.e. L(znew) < L(zcurrent), which gives us
information whether q < p.
If the current set M contains i elements which belong to the smallest m, the probability of increasing
it to i+ 1 elements with the next pick is equal to
P[i→ i+ 1] = P[p /∈ smallest m, q ∈ smallest m] = k − i
k
· m− i
d− k .
Then the expected number of iterations for the step i→ i+ 1 is equal to
E[ti+1 − ti] = (d− k)k
(k − i)(m− i)
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since all the draws are independent. Assuming that we begin with none of the smallest m elements
in M , the expected number of iterations tk needed to find a set of k weights out of the smallest m
weights is given by
E[tk] =
k−1∑
i=0
E[ti+1 − ti] =
k−1∑
i=0
(d− k)k
(k − i)(m− i) = (d− k)k
k−1∑
i=0
1
(k − i)(m− i) . (10)
Now assuming that m > k, we can write the summation as:
k−1∑
i=0
1
(k − i)(m− i) =
k∑
j=1
1
j(j +m− k) =
1
m− k
k∑
j=1
(
1
j
− 1
j +m− k
)
=
=
1
m− k (Hk −Hm +Hm−k) , (11)
where Hk is the k-th harmonic number. Using the fact that ln(k) < Hk ≤ ln(k) + 1, we have:
Hk −Hm +Hm−k < ln(k)− ln(m) + ln(m− k) + 2 < ln(k) + 2.
If we combine this result with Eq. (10) and Eq. (11), we obtain the desired upper bound on E [tk]:
E [tk] < (d− k)k ln(k) + 2
m− k .
We further remark that for m = k we get that E[tk] = (d− k)k
∑k
j=1
1
j2 <
pi2
6 (d− k)k, however
we are interested in the setting when the gap m− k is large enough so that E [tk] becomes sublinear.
F Ablation studies
We here present a series of studies to better understand the robustness of our algorithm to different
random seeds, how its performance changes depending on αinit and to justify the algorithmic choice
of the piecewise decaying schedule for α(i). We focus on l0-RS on ImageNet as in this context we
can compare both success rate and query efficiency with different sparsity levels.
Different random seeds: First, we study how the performance of l0-RS varies when using different
random seeds, which influence the stochastic component inherent in random search. In Table 8 we
report mean and standard deviation over 10 runs (with different seeds) of success rate, average and
median queries of l0-RS on VGG and ResNet with sparsity levels k ∈ {50, 100, 150} (the same setup
of Sec. 4.2). One can observe that the success rate is very stable in all the cases, and the statistics of
query consumption consistent across different runs.
Table 8: Mean and standard deviation of the performance (success rate and query efficiency) of l0-RS
repeated with 10 different random seeds.
model k success rate (%) successful points all pointsavg. queries med. queries avg. queries med. queries
VGG
50 97.4± 0.42 497± 28 80± 4 745± 43 86± 5
100 99.8± 0.14 320± 20 42± 3 335± 17 43± 3
150 100.0± 0.00 193± 16 26± 2 193± 16 26± 2
ResNet
50 94.6± 0.70 686± 47 135± 6 1187± 48 166± 11
100 99.7± 0.15 544± 36 73± 5 571± 26 74± 5
150 100.0± 0.00 365± 19 49± 3 365± 19 49± 3
Different values of αinit: In second place, we analyze the behaviour of our algorithm with different
values of αinit, since it is the only free hyperparameter of Sparse-RS. Let us recall that it is used
to regulate how much M ′ and ∆′ differ from M and ∆ respectively in steps 6-7 of Alg. 1 at each
iteration. Fig. 7 shows the success rate and query usage (computed on the successful samples)
of our untargeted l0-bounded attack on VGG at the usual three sparsity levels k for runs with
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αinit ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} (for our experiments in Sec. 4.2 we use αinit = 0.3).
We observe that the success rate is similar (close to 100%) for all the values, with a slight degradation
for the largest ones. In order to minimize the queries of the classifier, the runs with αinit between 0.1
and 0.4 are comparably good, with small differences in the tradeoff between average and median
number of queries.
Constant vs decaying α(i): In order to demonstrate the role of decaying the difference between
the candidate updates M ′ and ∆′ and the current iterates M and ∆ over iterations (see steps 6-7
of Alg. 1) to achieve good performance, we run our attack with constant α(i) schedule instead of
the piecewise constant schedule with decreasing values. We fix α(i) = c ∈ [0, 1] for every i so that
for the whole algorithm M ′ and M differ in max{c · k, 1} elements. In Fig. 8 we report the results
achieved by c ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5, 1} on VGG at k ∈ {50, 100, 150}, together with the baseline
(black dashed line) of the standard version of l0-RS. One can observe that small constant values c for
α(i) = c achieve good success rate but suffer in query efficiency, in particular computed regarding
the median and for larger k, while the highest values of c lead to significantly worse success rate
(note that average and median queries are computed only on the successful points) than the baseline.
These results highlight how important it is to have an initial exploration phase, with a larger step size,
and at a later stage a more local optimization.
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Figure 7: Ablation study on the influence of αinit, the hyperparameter which regulates the size of the
updates at each iteration. We show success rate (first column), average (second) and median queries
(third) achieved by l0-RS on VGG at sparsity levels k = {50, 100, 150}. Considering jointly the
three statistics values in [0.1, 0.4] are preferable for this threat model and schedule.
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Figure 8: Peformance of l0-RS on VGG when using a constant schedule for α(i), that is the size of
|A| = |B| = c · k (see Sec. 4.2) at every iteration, or equivalently α(i) = c for every i = 1, . . . , N .
The dashed line is the reference of the results achieved with the piecewise constant schedule to decay
α(i). While constantly small updates lead to good success rate, the median number of queries used
increases notably, especially with larger sparsity levels k.
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target: maypole
orig: iron
 pred: maypole
orig: lycaenid
 pred: admiral
orig: quail
 pred: quail
orig: golfcart
 pred: golfcart
orig: American_black_bear
 pred: maypole
orig: eel
 pred: maypole
orig: tripod
 pred: maypole
orig: goblet
 pred: maypole
orig: sea_snake
 pred: maypole
orig: scabbard
 pred: maypole
orig: paddlewheel
 pred: maypole
orig: chain_mail
 pred: maypole
target: mailbox
orig: alligator_lizard
 pred: alligator_lizard
orig: flagpole
 pred: mailbox
orig: zebra
 pred: mailbox
orig: baseball
 pred: baseball
orig: corn
 pred: mailbox
orig: street_sign
 pred: mailbox
orig: Egyptian_cat
 pred: mailbox
orig: bullet_train
 pred: mailbox
orig: ocarina
 pred: ocarina
orig: spotted_salamander
 pred: spotted_salamander
orig: macaque
 pred: macaque
orig: Pomeranian
 pred: Pomeranian
target: peacock
orig: snowplow
 pred: peacock
orig: greenhouse
 pred: peacock
orig: stethoscope
 pred: peacock
orig: sea_snake
 pred: peacock
orig: half_track
 pred: peacock
orig: bubble
 pred: bubble
orig: crossword_puzzle
 pred: peacock
orig: obelisk
 pred: peacock
orig: drake
 pred: peacock
orig: boa_constrictor
 pred: peacock
orig: terrapin
 pred: peacock
orig: indri
 pred: peacock
Figure 9: Example applications of universal targeted patches and frames for target classes "maypole",
"mailbox" and "peacock", produced with our attack Sparse-RS.
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target: traffic light
orig: Weimaraner
 pred: traffic_light
orig: maillot
 pred: traffic_light
orig: police_van
 pred: traffic_light
orig: anemone_fish
 pred: traffic_light
orig: pill_bottle
 pred: traffic_light
orig: folding_chair
 pred: traffic_light
orig: redshank
 pred: traffic_light
orig: water_snake
 pred: traffic_light
orig: drilling_platform
 pred: traffic_light
orig: coucal
 pred: traffic_light
orig: radiator
 pred: traffic_light
orig: half_track
 pred: traffic_light
target: digital clock
orig: file
 pred: digital_clock
orig: cardoon
 pred: digital_clock
orig: giant_panda
 pred: digital_clock
orig: lakeside
 pred: digital_clock
orig: speedboat
 pred: digital_clock
orig: mask
 pred: digital_clock
orig: ocarina
 pred: digital_clock
orig: isopod
 pred: isopod
orig: sarong
 pred: slot
orig: tow_truck
 pred: traffic_light
orig: zucchini
 pred: abacus
orig: plane
 pred: abacus
target: wardrobe
orig: seashore
 pred: soccer_ball
orig: overskirt
 pred: soccer_ball
orig: suit
 pred: parachute
orig: honeycomb
 pred: teddy
orig: gazelle
 pred: macaw
orig: worm_fence
 pred: worm_fence
orig: vizsla
 pred: vizsla
orig: dragonfly
 pred: confectionery
orig: switch
 pred: vending_machine
orig: hatchet
 pred: mask
orig: French_loaf
 pred: hotdog
orig: beaker
 pred: candle
Figure 10: Example applications of universal targeted patches and frames for target classes "traffic
light", "digital clock" and "wardrobe", produced with our attack Sparse-RS.
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